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CARROTS, STICKS, AND SPACE PATENTS
KYLE HOWARTH†
ABSTRACT
Patents are essential for promoting scientific progress and
innovation. However, the current framework for patents in outer space
unduly disincentivizes U.S. patentees from obtaining patents.
Importantly, these disincentives may hinder innovation for vital
technologies relating to space. This Note explains why international
collaboration is necessary to solve this problem and how the United
States can incentivize international support for a space patent regime.
Specifically, this Note advocates a patent regime consisting of a single
set of substantive and procedural patent laws governing the distinct
territory of space. First, Part I provides a background on current patent
laws in space. Next, Part II explains how current law disincentivizes
patenting and how an international patent regime could ameliorate
these problems. Finally, Part III uses rational choice theory to explain
how the United States could balance the competing interests of other
states to create a functioning patent system for U.S. patentees.

INTRODUCTION
The phrase “carrots and sticks” was initially used to describe how
incentives and disincentives could elicit a desired behavior for driving
a donkey.1 In this example, carrots were incentives that motivated the
donkey toward a desired result, and sticks were disincentives that
discouraged an undesired result.2 Although there are no actual
donkeys or carrots in space,3 this metaphor is useful for analyzing the
present patent system in space. For patents in space, the current system
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1. Carrot-and-stick, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
carrot-and-stick [https://perma.cc/F6WV-75F4].
2. Id.
3. But see SPACE JAM (Warner Bros. 1996) (depicting Bugs Bunny, a rabbit, in outer space
consuming his favorite snack, carrots).
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of carrots and sticks is inapt to encourage innovation by U.S.
companies. This Note explains why resolving inadequacies for patents
in space requires international collaboration and how the United States
can use carrots and sticks to achieve international support for a space
patent regime.
Two primary objectives of the patent system are to promote
scientific progress and enhance the breadth of scientific knowledge in
the world.4 To achieve this, patentees are granted an exclusive right to
an invention in exchange for publicly disclosing information on how
their invention works.5 Thus, the patent system assumes patentees are
rational actors.6 Incentivized by the economic prospects of an exclusive
right to an invention, a patentee will expend additional effort to
innovate.7 Further, these economic incentives are great enough that a
patentee is willing to disclose the invention rather than keep it secret.8
This disclosure can then buttress the innovation of future generations.9
In the context of international law, rational choice theory assumes
that states are also rational actors.10 Much like private actors in the
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries[.]”); see also WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND SPACE ACTIVITIES 2 (2004) [hereinafter WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY], www.wipo.int/
patent-law/en/developments/pdf/ip_space.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9CF-PG9W] (acknowledging
patents “enrich the total body of technical knowledge in the world”).
5. WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 4; see also Graham v. John Deere Co. of
Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (describing a patent as “a reward, an inducement, to bring forth
new knowledge”).
6. See, e.g., WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294–333 (2003) (treating patentees as rational actors when
evaluating patent incentives).
7. See id. at 300 (positing that patentees will increase spending on innovation so long as the
economic returns from potentially broader patent protection are greater than the marginal
increase in expenditures to innovate).
8. See Sean B. Seymore, Symposium: The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, 69
VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1455 (2016) (“[I]n exchange for the right to exclude, the inventor must fully
disclose the technical details of the invention.”).
9. WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 4. Although the type of information that
must be disclosed varies by country, most countries require some disclosure about how to make
and use the invention. See generally WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., SUFFICIENCY OF DISCLOSURE
(2021), https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/scp/en/national_laws/disclosure.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/BE3M-RBPN] (summarizing countries’ disclosure requirements).
10. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
(2005) (theorizing that “international law emerges from states acting rationally to maximize their
interests”); see generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008) [hereinafter GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW
WORKS] (using rational choice theory to demonstrate how international law can influence state
behavior).
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patent system, states are assumed to have distinct interests and to act
rationally to maximize those interests.11 States’ differing views on
patents are an example of these distinct interests. Whereas developed
nations tend to view strong patent protection as essential to the
economy, developing nations seeking to gain access to new markets
prefer to limit exclusive rights.12 The strength of a state’s space industry
may also affect that state’s views on the necessity of patent protection.13
For the most part, both the U.S. government and private U.S.
patentees prefer strong patent protection in space.14 U.S. patentees
value strong patent protection to ensure they can exclude potential
infringers from profiting off their inventions.15 Likewise, policymakers
in the United States want to ensure that this robust protection for U.S.
patentees will continue to encourage innovation and investment in the
country.16 However, patent law is territorial in nature, with each
country having its own distinct set of patent laws.17 Space, by contrast,

11. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 10, at 7.
12. Robert C. Bird & Subhash C. Jain, The Continuing Challenge of Global Intellectual
Property Rights, in THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 11 (Robert
C. Bird & Subhash C. Jain eds., 2008). Consider, for instance, India, where weak pharmaceutical
patent protections have led some commentators to refer to the generic drug market as a “copying
industry” that allows companies to make money “copying stuff that is patented in the rest of the
world.” Roger Collier, Drug Patents: Innovation v. Accessibility, 185 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J.
E379, E379 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3680575/pdf/185e379.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5UJ6-7U7N].
13. See infra Part III.
14. Although there is no exact definition of “strong” patent protection, it is generally
characterized by a large scope of patentability, numerous enforcement mechanisms for patent
owners, and a long duration of patent protection. See Suma Athreye, Lucia Piscitello & Kenneth
C. Shadlen, Twenty-Five Years Since TRIPS: Patent Policy and International Business, 3 J. INT’L
BUS. POL’Y 315, 318 (2020) (outlining the above criteria for strong patent protection).
15. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 320 (claiming that broader protection is valuable
to the patentee because the patentee can more readily prevent others from obtaining a similar
patent).
16. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. See generally U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., U.S.
CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX (2021) [hereinafter U.S. CHAMBER IP INDEX 2021], https:/
/www.valueingenuity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GIPC_IPIndex2021_FullReport.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/T8ZJ-P6DL] (advocating robust and predictable IP rights and analyzing methods to
improve global IP protection).
17. Frequently Asked Questions: Patents, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. [hereafter Frequently
Asked Questions: Patents], https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/faq_patents.html [https://perma.cc/
HQ7P-NGVB]. Further, a country’s patent laws can usually only be enforced in that country. See
Protecting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Overseas, USPTO (Nov. 1, 2019, 1:40 PM) [hereafter
Protecting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Overseas], https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/iprtoolkits [https://perma.cc/9T3R-FVC3] (“U.S. patent[s] extend only throughout the territory of
the United States and have no effect in a foreign country . . . .”).
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is not subject to claims of sovereign ownership.18 This dichotomy has
made it difficult for the United States to unilaterally protect U.S.
patentees in outer space.19
For example, imagine a U.S. pharmaceutical company working to
improve a cancer-fighting drug. The company finds that it can greatly
increase the purity of the drug by producing it in a low-gravity
environment.20 The U.S. company subsequently obtains a patent in
multiple countries for an innovative method of producing the drug in
microgravity. Because microgravity environments are imperfect and
difficult to sustain on Earth,21 the U.S. company invests to create a
permanent manufacturing plant for the drug in space. However, a
savvy competitor decides to use the disclosure from the patent to copy
the U.S. company’s process. Under current patent law, the competitor
could likely evade infringement by registering its manufacturing lab in
a country with weak patent protection before launching it into space.22
Even as the competitor exploited the U.S. company’s invention, the
United States would likely be unable to assert jurisdiction to enforce
the patent.23 Thus, the strength of the U.S. company’s patent would
diminish, disincentivizing future patentees from expending the effort
to create and disclose innovative drugs.24 This dilemma is known as the
“flag of convenience” problem, and it is just one of many disincentives
to patenting that U.S. space companies may face.25

18. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 2, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
19. See generally Marie Weisfeiler, Patent Law in Space, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F.
(2019) (advocating for an international organization to resolve current gaps in patents in space).
But see William C. Pannell, Pirate Battles in Outer Space: Preventing Patent Infringement on the
8th Sea, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 733, 757–59 (2016) (suggesting the United States could pass
legislation that might limit some of the current problems in space).
20. See TOSAPORN LEEPUENGTHAM, THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 72 (2017) (acknowledging that low-gravity environments
could increase drug purity).
21. See Katarina Zimmer, Pharma Looks to Outer Space To Boost Drug R&D, SCIENTIST
(Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.the-scientist.com/bio-business/pharma-looks-to-outer-space-to-boostdrug-rd—68183 [https://perma.cc/TVJ2-QG4M] (explaining how pharmaceutical companies are
already exploring the potential benefits of space on drug manufacturing).
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. Cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 320 (emphasizing how stronger protection
creates greater incentives to patent).
25. See infra Part II.
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Although patent infringement in space is not currently prevalent,
the rapid commercialization of space will likely lead to patent disputes
in the near future.26 Because the United States values patent protection
and has one of the strongest space industries,27 the United States should
pioneer a potential solution to problems plaguing patents in space. This
Note explains why an international patent regime for space is necessary
to solve these problems and how the United States can work to achieve
this. Specifically, this Note advocates a patent regime consisting of a
single set of substantive and procedural patent laws governing the
distinct territory of space.
First, Part I provides a brief description of relevant laws currently
governing patents in space. The relative lack of explicit laws regulating
patents in space creates potential problems for U.S. patentees. Part II
elaborates on the features of the current system that disincentivize U.S.
patentees from obtaining patents and explains how an international
patent regime could ameliorate these problems. Specifically, the flag of
convenience problem disincentivizes patenting by requiring patentees
to expend tremendous costs to obtain adequate patent protection in
space. Procedural changes such as creating a single patent filing and
examination system for space would resolve this problem. Moreover,
current jurisdictional disputes in space make it difficult to determine
which substantive rules apply, again disincentivizing patenting.
Treating space as a distinct territory with a single set of substantive
patent laws would fix this issue. Finally, Part III proffers ways the
United States could balance the competing interests of other states to
effectuate a functioning space patent system for U.S. patentees. Using
rational choice theory, it is possible to group states together based on
their likelihood to support an international patent regime for space.
Drawing on other examples from international law, this Part attempts
to demonstrate how the United States could incentivize support from

26. See Theodore U. Ro, Matthew J. Kleiman & Kurt G. Hammerle, Patent Infringement in
Outer Space in Light of 35 U.S.C. § 105: Following the White Rabbit down the Rabbit Loophole,
17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 202, 205 (2011) (claiming that there is currently a “commercial space
race” that will likely require increasing application of intellectual property laws in space); see also
Weisfeiler, supra note 19, at 1 n.1 (predicting that space travel will allow for more private business
ventures).
27. See U.S. CHAMBER IP INDEX 2021, supra note 16, at 308–10 (ranking the United States
as a leading country for IP protection and outlining ways the United States is continuing to
strengthen patent protection); SPACETECH ANALYTICS, SPACETECH GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY
2021 / Q2 LANDSCAPE OVERVIEW 2 (2021), https://analytics.dkv.global/spacetech/SpaceTechGovernment-Activity-Overview-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M8X-BP9R] (noting that the United
States continues to have the highest level of space activity among countries).
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each group of states. After support is achieved, there are many
potential enforcement mechanisms for the patent laws.28 However, a
detailed discussion of enforcement is beyond the scope of this Note.
I. CURRENT PATENT LAWS
This Part provides a cursory overview of current patent laws. The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”) is a multilateral agreement governing intellectual property.
For space-specific patent laws, two relevant international agreements
are the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (“Registration Convention”) and the International Space
Station Intergovernmental Agreement (“IGA”).29 The United States
enacted the Patents in Space Act in 1990,30 but that act simply
incorporates the preexisting international framework into domestic
law.
A. The TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS Agreement is a 1995 multilateral agreement aimed at
creating certain minimum standards of patent protection in signatory
countries.31 Specifically, TRIPS requires countries to make patents
available in all fields of technology.32 Additionally, inventions must
satisfy some form of novelty, inventiveness, and industrial utility

28. Compare, e.g., Weisfeiler, supra note 19, at 8–9 (advocating for the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), a formal international organization, to enforce patents in space),
with Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the
Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 742 (2001) (noting that in the past the United
States has chosen to incorporate international intellectual property agreements into domestic law
through legislation).
29. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8,480 [hereinafter Registration Convention]; Agreement Among the
Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the
Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the
United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, Jan.
29, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12927 [hereinafter IGA].
30. Patents in Space Act, Pub. L. No. 101-580, 104 Stat. 2863 (1990) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 105).
31. See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WTO [hereinafter Overview: The TRIPS
Agreement], https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm [https://perma.cc/U9ENKVVE] (noting that the TRIPS Agreement set out substantive standards, enforcement
procedures, and a dispute settlement system for IP rights).
32. Id.
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standards to qualify for a patent.33 Thus far, over one hundred
countries have accepted TRIPS.34
However, each country retains latitude to craft its own domestic
patent laws.35 This presents three issues that must be addressed to truly
harmonize substantive patent law. First, each country has different
practices for complying with TRIPS conditions.36 For instance, even if
TRIPS sets conditions for compulsory licensing, each country
determines for itself what behavior by patent owners would satisfy
these conditions.37 Second, TRIPS only sets out minimum standards of
patent protection.38 Accordingly, the strength of patent protection still
varies substantially across countries.39 Finally, each country maintains
independent patent prosecution procedures, requiring a patentee to
complete a full examination process in each country they seek a patent
in.40 Thus, the TRIPS Agreement still falls short of harmonizing
international patent law.
B. The Registration Convention
The Registration Convention is a 1975 United Nations (“U.N.”)
agreement designed to assign objects launched into space to a specific
country. The effect of the Registration Convention when read with
previous agreements is that the “launching state” retains jurisdiction
over an object launched into space.41 Thus, the launching state can
extend its patent laws to registered space objects.42
A launching state is (1) a state that launches a space object, (2) a
state that “procures the launching of a space object,” (3) a state that

33. Id.
34. See Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS [Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights] in the WTO, WTO [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS],
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm [https://perma.cc/YXB5-BWU7] (emphasizing
that TRIPS applies to all World Trade Organization members). Note that many developing
countries were granted waivers and are thus not yet obligated to implement the full terms of the
TRIPS Agreement. Id.
35. See Athreye et al., supra note 14, at 321 (“Although TRIPS established harmonization,
it did not create a world of uniform patent policies and levels of patent protection.”).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 31.
39. Athreye et al., supra note 14, at 317, 321.
40. See Ro et al., supra note 26, at 207 (noting that patentees must file a domestic application
in each jurisdiction in which they are seeking a patent).
41. Id. at 208.
42. Id.
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has a space object launched from its territory, or (4) a state that has a
space object launched from its facility.43 Under this definition, there
could be more than one potential launching state for a single space
object.44 For competing claims of jurisdiction, the Registration
Convention instructs potential launching states to “jointly determine”
a single launching state.45
Although the Registration Convention only refers to the actions
of states, rather than private companies, some commentators have
suggested that a state can become a launching state through the actions
of private companies incorporated in the state.46 In other words, even
if a private U.S. company procured a space object, the U.S. government
would qualify as a launching state.47 In practice, the United States has
seemed to support this interpretation of the Registration Convention,
as it has historically claimed to be a launching state based on the actions
of private corporations.48
C. The International Space Station
The IGA is a multilateral treaty designed to assign jurisdiction on
the International Space Station (“ISS”).49 The ISS is composed of
multiple modules, each registered to a state.50 Under the agreement,
each country retains jurisdiction over its distinct module of the ISS.51
Specifically, Article 21 of the IGA states, “[F]or purposes of
intellectual property law, an activity occurring in or on a Space Station
flight element shall be deemed to have occurred only in the territory of

43. Id. at 215.
44. See Babak Shakouri Hassanabadi, Complications of the Legal Definition of “Launching
State,” SPACE REV. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2588/1 [https://perm
a.cc/TXP3-YKCS] (outlining instances where more than one country could be a launching state
for an object).
45. Registration Convention, supra note 29, at art. II(2).
46. Ro et al., supra note 26, at 215–16.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 217 (noting historical examples where the United States’ claim as a launching
state was solely based on a private U.S. corporation procuring the space object).
49. IGA, supra note 29, at art. 5. Note that although the IGA was formally signed into U.S.
law in 1998, the agreement was a culmination of negotiations that had taken place since at least
1984. See id. at 1.
50. Pannell, supra note 19, at 747.
51. IGA, supra note 29, at art. 5.
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the Partner State of that element’s registry.”52 In other words, each
state’s own domestic patent laws apply in its module.53
D. The U.S. Patents in Space Act
The U.S. Patents in Space Act essentially embodies the
Registration Convention, while allowing individual treaties like the
IGA. Under the Patents in Space Act, (1) “[a]ny invention made, used
or sold in outer space on a space object or component thereof” that is
(2) “under the jurisdiction or control of the United States” is
considered to be made, used, or sold in the United States.54 The Act
does not specify what is required for an object to be “under the
jurisdiction or control” of the United States.55
The Patents in Space Act provides two exceptions to this rule.
First, U.S. patent law does not apply to any space object registered to
another country in accordance with the Registration Convention.56 As
long as an object has been launched under the Registration
Convention, the launching state retains jurisdiction.57 Second, U.S.
patent law does not apply to a space object specifically identified by an
international agreement to which the United States is a party.58 The
IGA, where the United States and other countries reached a specific
agreement to assign jurisdiction over each module, is an example.59
Thus, the Patents in Space Act gives strong deference to the
Registration Convention and other international agreements.
II. RESOLVING INADEQUACIES IN CURRENT PATENT LAW
Certain features of the patent law system in space disincentivize
U.S. companies from obtaining patents. The following Sections will
first briefly describe how the flag of convenience problem and
jurisdictional uncertainty disincentivize innovation. Then, the Sections
will highlight why unilateral action by the United States would not be
effective in resolving these problems. Ultimately, this Part concludes

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at art. 21.
Elizabeth I. Winston, Patent Boundaries, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 501, 537 (2015).
35 U.S.C. § 105.
See id.
Id.
See supra Part I.B.
35 U.S.C. § 105.
See IGA, supra note 29, at art. 5.
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that the appropriate solution likely requires a single set of international
patent regulations to govern the distinct territory of space.
A. The Flag of Convenience Problem: Why the United States Should
Work To Raise Minimum Patent Standards and Create a Single
Filing System
The current application of national patent laws based on a space
object’s country of registration disincentivizes U.S. patentees from
obtaining patents by requiring companies to balance the limited
territorial scope of patent protection with the high transaction costs
necessary to obtain a patent. Although many of these disincentives are
also a part of patent law on Earth, they are heightened in the context
of space. Moreover, unilateral extension of the U.S. patent laws cannot
resolve this problem.
Applying patent law based on an object’s country of registration
presents an opportunity for companies to exploit U.S. companies’
novel innovations. Recall that under the Registration Convention, the
national laws of the “launching state” apply to space objects.60 Further,
a company only has patent protection in countries where the company
holds a patent.61 Accordingly, it is possible for a competing company to
strategically register an infringing invention in a launching state where
a U.S. company has not obtained a patent.62 The previous hypothetical
of a U.S. pharmaceutical company attempting to patent a microgravity
process is one striking example of this flag of convenience problem.63
Broadly, the flag of convenience loophole disincentivizes
patenting by weakening the scope of patent protection. Without
protection, a company might not have adequate economic incentives
to obtain a patent, which would decrease innovation and disclosure.64
For instance, in the microgravity pharmaceutical example, the
infringing competitor would likely gain profits that the original

60. Matthew J. Kleiman, Patent Rights and Flags of Convenience in Outer Space, 23 AIR &
SPACE LAW. 4, 4 (2011).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 5 (suggesting companies will be incentivized to register in particular countries
to avoid infringement).
63. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text (introducing hypothetical example).
64. See J. Jonas Anderson, Hiding Behind Nationality: The Temporary Presence Exception
and Patent Infringement Avoidance, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 43 (2008) (arguing
that infringement resulting from inadequate patent protection reduces economic rewards for a
patentee, thereby reducing incentives to innovate).
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inventor would have earned with patent protection.65 Research in the
pharmaceutical and space industries is expensive and requires a large
amount of capital.66 Thus, without the economic security of a patent,
the U.S. company might have been discouraged from creating the
innovative drug altogether.67 However, even if the company would
have created the drug regardless of patent protection, weak patent
protection could discourage an inventor from disclosing the technology
to competitors in a patent.68 As a result, the technology from the patent
could not be used to advance further innovations once the patent term
expired.69
One apparent solution to the flag of convenience problem might
be for a company to obtain a patent in every country. However, there
are competing disincentives that deter a company from seeking to do
this. To start, it is unlikely that every country would allow the company
to obtain a patent. As countries have done with maritime law,70 certain
countries may elect to create low enforcement standards to incentivize
infringing companies to register and invest in the country.71
Additionally, a patentee must also balance the desire for patent
protection with the cost and efficiency of obtaining a patent in multiple
countries. The numerous domestic patent law systems on Earth create

65. Cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 324–25 (noting broad patent protection increases
profits because competitors are not able to make similar substitutes).
66. See Nick Skillicorn, Top 1000 Companies That Spend the Most on Research &
Development (Charts and Analysis), IDEA TO VALUE (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.ideatoval
ue.com/inno/nickskillicorn/2019/08/top-1000-companies-that-spend-the-most-on-research-devel
opment-charts-and-analysis [https://perma.cc/8MFM-HM93] (listing pharmaceutical and aerospace
as top ten industries in R&D spending as of 2018).
67. See supra note 64.
68. See, e.g., Where Are SpaceX’s Patents? Its Trade Secrets Strategy Is Fraught with Peril,
PAT. FORECAST (May 27, 2021), https://www.patentforecast.com/2021/05/27/where-are-spacexspatents-its-trade-secrets-strategy-is-fraught-with-peril [https://perma.cc/BEZ6-DAPG] (emphasizing
how Elon Musk, founder of SpaceX, has elected to forgo patenting rocket technology for fear of
China using the disclosure as a “recipe book”).
69. Cf. WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 4 (arguing that patents benefit future
innovation through the disclosure requirement).
70. See Pannell, supra note 19, at 741 (describing how in maritime law, companies often
engage in “forum shopping” to seek out countries with the lowest costs, taxes, and liability); see
also supra Part I.A (noting that TRIPS still leaves large gaps in substantive patent protection and
enforcement).
71. See generally Yong Bum Lee, Public Space, Private Patents: Updating International Space
Law To Protect Patents in Outer Space, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 293 (2019) (discussing in detail the
potential for a “race to the bottom” problem where countries are economically incentivized to
serve as safe havens for patent infringement).
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high transaction costs to obtain a patent.72 Consequently, patentees
rarely expend the effort and money necessary to gain patent protection
in every country73 and instead target the few patent offices in which the
need for enforcement is the greatest.74 In this way, the flag of
convenience problem presents disincentives for patenting that are
indicative of patent law on Earth as well.75
Still, the disincentives created by the flag of convenience problem
are exacerbated in the context of space. Consider the microgravity
pharmaceutical example.76 The process for producing the drug was
uniquely designed and patented to be used in space. As noted before,
space was the only practical place to implement the process patent. The
inventor undertook the costs of research, development, and ultimately
manufacturing the drug in space. Nevertheless, the infringing
competitor obtained the same economic benefit from the same exact
resources without any of the costs the inventor undertook to create the
process.77 This would be unlikely to occur on Earth because a patentee
could obtain patents wherever a product was most prevalently used.78
Further, most patents on Earth are not required to be performed in a
specific geographic location.79 However, any country could potentially
serve as a launching state for an infringing product in space. Therefore,
protecting a patent used in space requires obtaining a patent in every
country.
72. See Anthony de Andrade, Twelve Ways To Manage Global Patent Costs, WIPO MAG.
(Aug. 2017), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/04/article_0007.html [https://perma.cc
/L5XF-R93V] (explaining the difficulty in managing a global patent portfolio with multiple filing
fees, examination processes, and translation costs).
73. See Michael D. Bednarek, Global Patent Strategy, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Nov. 1994,
at 12, 12 (“[F]ew individuals or even large companies can afford to protect every invention in
every country.”).
74. Anderson, supra note 64, at 35.
75. Note that even if innovation in expensive industries persists despite the flag of
convenience problem, U.S. companies may nonetheless face disincentives to innovate. Creating
a single filing system would limit these disincentives.
76. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text (introducing hypothetical example).
77. See Keith Reeves, 12 Steps from Product Concept to Manufacturing, BUS. 2 CMTY. (Apr.
20, 2016), https://www.business2community.com/product-management/12-steps-product-concept
-manufacturing-01518713 [https://perma.cc/VXH2-MNPC] (listing the steps necessary to
commercialize a product); see also Nihad A.M. Tamimi & Peter Ellis, Drug Development: From
Concept to Marketing!, 113 NEPHRON CLIN. PRACT. 125, 125 (2009) (emphasizing the particularly
high costs of commercializing a pharmaceutical drug).
78. See Kleiman, supra note 62, at 5 (pointing out that even in nonterritorial areas of Earth
like the high seas, there is at least a “destination country” that can assert its patent laws).
79. One exception might be deep-sea mining, where patents are primarily used in the deep
sea, where there is limited regulation. Pannell, supra note 19, at 742.
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Unilateral action by the United States would not sufficiently
resolve the flag of convenience problem for patents in space. Pointedly,
the opportunity for a potential infringer to exploit the flag of
convenience loophole exists so long as there is at least one country
where a U.S. company is unable to obtain a patent.80 Nevertheless,
some commentators have suggested the United States could partially
solve this dilemma unilaterally by banning any imports from an
infringing company.81 For instance, in the microgravity pharmaceutical
example, the United States could try to prevent the infringer from
selling any of the drugs to U.S. customers. Because the United States
accounts for a large share of global consumers, this would lessen the
economic benefit an infringing company could obtain.82
However, this does not adequately resolve the flag of convenience
problem. To start, it is unclear if the United States has a legal basis for
banning imports related to infringing space products.83 Still, even if
there is a legal basis, banning imports only covers the narrow case of
an infringer who wants to sell products in the United States. A
potential infringer may still obtain enough profit from other markets
and thus choose to utilize the flag of convenience loophole.84
Moreover, certain space industries, such as commercial tourism, do not
require any imports into the United States.85 Therefore, a ban on
imports would not affect an infringing company’s decision to use the

80. See id. (“Current patent law requires a company to apply for a patent in every country
where its space object may potentially be infringed upon.” (citation omitted)).
81. See id. at 757–59 (claiming the United States could lessen the impact of the flag of
convenience problem by banning imports from companies that utilize the loophole).
82. Id. at 759.
83. See Ro et al., supra note 26, at 225 (arguing that because 35 U.S.C. § 105 does not
explicitly address the acts of “offering to sell” and “importing,” it is unlikely U.S. patent law can
be used to prevent imports from companies using an infringing device).
84. See Homi Kharas & Wolfgang Fengler, Which Will Be the Top 30 Consumer Markets of
this Decade? 5 Asian Markets Below the Radar, BROOKINGS (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.brook
ings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/08/31/which-will-be-the-top-30-consumer-markets-of-thi
s-decade-5-asian-markets-below-the-radar [https://perma.cc/H4N2-MZBM] (recognizing that
other countries, such as China and India, have large consumer markets).
85. The commercial space tourism industry gives consumers an opportunity to experience
space travel. The proprietary aspects of this industry primarily relate to taking a consumer from
Earth to space and do not require any “imports.” For a discussion on the emergence of this
industry and unanswered legal questions related to commercial space tourism, see generally
Steven Freeland, Up, Up, and . . . Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and Its Impact on the
International Law of Outer Space, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005).
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flag of convenience loophole, and U.S. companies would remain
disincentivized from obtaining patents.86
At the very least, the flag of convenience problem requires the
United States to work to raise the minimum standards of patent
protection in every country and create a single patent filing system.
First, continuing to raise the standards of patent protection in every
country would prevent countries from serving as safe havens for
infringement. Current agreements, such as TRIPS, provide a
framework for this.87 Second, creating a single filing and examination
system would decrease the transaction costs of obtaining a patent in
every country. Although agreements such as the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (“PCT”) have attempted to implement variations of this, a true
single filing system does not yet exist.88
Notably, the flag of convenience problem does not necessitate a
single set of substantive patent laws for space. Even if each country
applied domestic patent law through the Registration Convention,
raising the standards and creating a true single filing system would
decrease many disincentives to patenting for U.S. companies.89
Nevertheless, the following Section outlines why a single set of patent
laws is likely needed.
B. Defining Boundaries: Why the United States Should Treat Space
as a Distinct Territory with a Single Set of Substantive Patent Laws
For current space launches, countries engage in both ex ante and
ex post negotiations with one another to clarify which country has
jurisdiction over a patented space object. When a country engages in
ex post negotiations, U.S. companies must wait for a decision on what

86. See Pannell, supra note 19, at 759 (advocating a ban on imports but also acknowledging
that in numerous space industries, a ban on imports would not affect infringing activities).
87. The TRIPS Agreement requires signatories to afford minimum standards of patent
protection to patentees and represents a movement toward the global harmonization of patent
law. However, each country still maintains its own distinct territorial patent laws. Athreye et al.,
supra note 14, at 321.
88. See Ro et al., supra note 26, at 207 (discussing the shortcomings of the PCT). Under the
PCT, an applicant can file an application for a patent that “reserves” a single priority date if the
applicant files a patent in other participating PCT countries. Id. However, the patent applicant
must still complete a full examination process in each individual country. Id. Therefore, a patentee
must still expend great effort to obtain a patent in each country. Like the TRIPS Agreement, the
PCT has achieved widespread support, and now has 156 contracting states. The PCT Now Has
156 Contracting States, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/pct/en/pct_contract
ing_states.html [https://perma.cc/Z7UE-UP3A].
89. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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the applicable patent laws are. This uncertainty regarding the law will
disincentivize patenting, as has happened in similar domestic settings.90
Nevertheless, the lack of clear territorial boundaries in space makes it
difficult for countries to act ex ante to resolve potential jurisdictional
disputes. Because jurisdictional concerns often require negotiations
with other countries, unilateral action by the United States would not
be appropriate. Defining space as a distinct territory with a single set
of patent laws could alleviate current jurisdictional issues.
When possible, the United States has attempted to negotiate
international treaties in advance to clarify the jurisdictional rules for
private companies.91 One example of this is the IGA, which clarified
that each country retains jurisdiction over its distinct module on the
ISS.92 Accordingly, U.S. companies know which set of patent laws
applies based on the module in which an activity takes place.93
However, there are still many instances where a company may be
uncertain about what legal rules apply and must wait for resolution
after electing to launch a space object.
Consider, for instance, a scenario where multiple countries could
potentially have jurisdiction over a launch.94 Suppose a U.S. company
built a satellite for use in the Netherlands. The U.S. company elects to
launch the satellite from a Japanese facility located in French
territory.95 Moreover, assume the U.S. company does not have
expertise in actual launch procedures and instead partners with a
Chinese company that specializes in satellite launches. Recall that a

90. See infra notes 108–115 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., IGA, supra note 29 (defining the jurisdictional rules for the ISS).
92. See supra Part I.C.
93. See Juan Felipe Jimenez, Patents in Outer Space: An Approach to the Legal Framework
of Future Inventions, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 447, 456 (2016) (noting that patent
jurisdiction is based on a module’s country of registration). But see Kurt G. Hammerle &
Theodore U. Ro, The Extra-Territorial Reach of U.S. Patent Law on Space-Related Activities:
Does the “International Shoe” Fit as We Reach for the Stars?, 34 J. SPACE L. 241, 265–73 (2008)
(noting there are still some legal rules, such as the temporary presence doctrine, that might create
legal uncertainties on the ISS).
94. See Jack Wright Nelson, Lost in Space? Gaps in the International Space Object
Registration Regime, EJIL:TALK! (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/lost-in-space-gaps-inthe-international-space-object-registration-regime [https://perma.cc/Q26M-Z64N] (analyzing the
NSS-6 and NSS-7 satellite launches, where the United States, the Netherlands, and France could
each claim “launching state” status because a U.S. company built the satellites for use by a Dutch
company and the satellites were launched from French territory).
95. See, e.g., Overseas Offices, JAXA, https://global.jaxa.jp/about/centers/resident/index.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/3G6G-ZD68] (listing international offices of the Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency (JAXA), including one in France).
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launching state is (1) a state that launches a space object, (2) a state
that “procures the launching of a space object,” (3) a state that has a
space object launched from its territory, or (4) a state that has a space
object launched from its facility.96 Under current interpretations of the
Registration Convention, China might have a claim as a launching state
because a Chinese company performed the actual launch procedures.97
Additionally, the United States could claim a U.S. company was
bringing forth the satellite, while the Netherlands could claim the
satellite’s intended use was to benefit the Netherlands. Consequently,
both the United States and the Netherlands could likely claim to have
“procured” the satellite and therefore qualify as launching states.98
Moreover, France would likely be a launching state because the launch
occurred in French territory.99 Finally, Japan would likely be a
launching state because the launch occurred in a Japanese facility.100
Thus, in this hypothetical there are at least five countries that could
qualify as launching states. Nevertheless, as the space economy grows
increasingly privatized, it is possible to imagine that even more
countries may have a claim as a launching state.101
If there are multiple potential launching states, they must
negotiate to determine which state will register the object.102
Consequently, the hypothetical U.S. satellite company would not know
which country’s patent laws would apply until the United States, the
Netherlands, China, Japan, and France all agreed on which state would
serve as the launching state.103 To complicate matters further, launches

96. See Registration Convention, supra note 29, at art. I (defining the term “launching
state”). Also recall that states can become launching states through the actions of their private
corporations. See supra Part I.B.
97. See Registration Convention, supra note 29, at art. I (defining “launching state” to
include a state that launches a space object).
98. See id. (defining “launching state” to include a state that procures the launching of a
space object).
99. See id. (defining “launching state” to include a state from whose territory a space object
is launched).
100. See id. (defining “launching state” to include a state from whose facility a space object is
launched).
101. See Henry R. Hertzfeld, Globalization, Commercial Space and Spacepower in the USA,
23 SPACE POL’Y 210, 212 (acknowledging a current trend toward multinational firms and
globalization in space).
102. See Registration Convention, supra note 29, at art. II(2) (“Where there are two or more
launching States in respect of any such space object, they shall jointly determine which one of them
shall register the object in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article . . . .” (emphasis added)).
103. See id.
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may involve more than one space object.104 For instance, imagine that
the hypothetical U.S. company launched over one hundred satellites
on a single rocket.105 Each of those satellites could be a distinct
patented space object.106 Moreover, each space object could have
numerous potential launching states.107 Thus, a U.S. company could
face an increasing number of jurisdictional disputes as the number of
space objects and potential launching states increases. In each instance,
the U.S. company would have to wait for the potential launching states
to agree on which country will register the space object, creating
uncertainty on which legal rules apply.
Lack of clarity regarding what legal rules apply likely
disincentivizes patents.108 For instance, in the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry, some commentators attributed a decrease in innovative drug
approvals to unpredictable patent rules.109 Specifically, delayed
clarification of recognized ambiguities in U.S. patent law discouraged
drug companies from taking on “high-risk investments to create new
medicines.”110 Much like the development of new drugs, the
development of innovative space technology is a costly endeavor.111 A
U.S. space company may not be willing to invest in developing this
innovative technology if it is not clear what rules will apply to a
potential patent. As noted previously, in the space context a U.S.

104. See, e.g., Amy Thompson, SpaceX Launches a Record 143 Satellites on One Rocket, Aces
Landing, SPACE.COM (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.space.com/spacex-launches-143-satellites-tra
nsporter-1-rocket-landing [https://perma.cc/K5H7-MVLG] (detailing how one SpaceX launch
involved 143 distinct satellites).
105. See id.
106. See Registration Convention, supra note 29, at art. I(b) (defining “space object”
somewhat circularly to only include “component parts of a space object”). A unique satellite is
unlikely to be a component part of another satellite.
107. See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
108. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Patently Uncertain, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 32 (2019)
(noting that uncertainty is pervasive in patent law and claiming that this uncertainty is “akin to
buying a lottery ticket and not knowing how many numbers, or perhaps even letters, will be used
to determine the winner”).
109. See generally Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 645 (2011) (partially blaming a decline in drug
innovation on distinct ambiguities in disclosure, utility, patent-eligible subject matter, and
obviousness that were not addressed expediently by U.S. courts).
110. See id. at 648 (describing a video presentation by Robert Armitage, general counsel for
pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly, that includes a PowerPoint slide labeled: “Uncertain,
unpredictable patent enforceability will destroy the ability to make the high-risk investments to
create new medicines.”).
111. See Skillicorn, supra note 66 (listing numerous aerospace companies among the highest
R&D spenders).
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company may have to wait for ex post negotiations by countries to
clarify the relevant legal rules. Even with a single patent filing system
and minimum standards, each country could still have unique
substantive patent laws.112 Consequently, a U.S. company may be
subject to a variety of substantive patent laws until the jurisdictional
disputes are resolved.113 This delay in the clarification of rules is akin
to what the pharmaceutical industry experienced and would likely
disincentivize a company from trying to obtain a patent.114 The United
States could resolve this dilemma by taking steps ex ante to eliminate
the current ambiguities with patent law in space. Because the disputes
primarily involve jurisdictional claims with other countries, the United
States would have to negotiate multilateral arrangements.115
Nevertheless, it is difficult for the United States to resolve
jurisdictional disputes ex ante. This is primarily because much of space
involves nonterritorial rights, while patent law is by nature territorial.116
One advantage of the IGA is that the ISS is a quasi-territory.117 Each
country on the ISS has a discrete module that effectively acts as a quasiterritory of the representative country.118 Accordingly, countries could
use these clearly delineated boundaries to assign jurisdiction ahead of
time.119 Space, however, is not subject to claims of national

112. See, e.g., Weisfeiler, supra note 19, at 5 n.45 (highlighting substantive differences between
domestic patent law systems, even between developed countries, by noting that Russia has a
compulsory sublicensing requirement for patents while the United States does not); see also
WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 4, at 22 (pointing out other differences between
patent law systems in such areas as the entitlement to rights, the protection of confidential
information, and the enforceability of court judgments).
113. See supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text.
114. Unlike the problem the U.S. pharmaceutical industry faced regarding what the
applicable laws meant, the U.S. space industry primarily faces a jurisdictional question of which
country’s laws apply to begin with. However, it is not clear that this distinction affects the analysis
in any meaningful way. In both instances, there is a clear ambiguity that would affect the
predictability of a future patentee’s patent rights if left unresolved.
115. See Jay A. Erstling, A Framework for Patent Exhaustion from Foreign Sales, 25
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 499, 508 (2015) (delineating the limits of the United
States’ ability to act unilaterally by noting that “[t]he presumption that United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in patent law”).
116. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, at art. II (“Outer space . . . is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty . . . .”); see also Frequently Asked Questions:
Patents, supra note 17 (explaining that patents are only enforceable in the territory in which they
are granted).
117. Weisfeiler, supra note 19, at 5.
118. See Winston, Patent Boundaries, supra note 53, at 536.
119. Jimenez, supra note 93, at 455.
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appropriation.120 There are no clearly demarcated territories or quasiterritories. Because of this, agreements such as the Registration
Convention naturally result in jurisdictional disputes. However, these
disputes are difficult to solve ex ante because a country would have to
expend excessive transaction costs to account for possible
contingencies.121 Consider the hypothetical where there are multiple
potential launching states for a space object.122 How could the United
States accurately craft a legal rule ex ante to handle this scenario
without knowing the facts at hand? For example, the United States
might be willing to sacrifice jurisdiction for a standard satellite launch
but less willing if a competing launching state presented national
security concerns.123 Ultimately, the lack of clear boundaries makes it
difficult to promulgate a bright-line legal rule. Defining space as its
own territory with distinct patent laws would allow the United States
to clarify many ambiguities ahead of time.124
One alternative rule that might limit ambiguities would be to
assign jurisdiction based on the state a company is incorporated in.125
However, this solution is ultimately at odds with the normative
framework of patent law. As emphasized previously, jurisdiction for
patent law is determined based on the territory in which patented
120. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 18, at art. II.
121. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1823, 1855 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory] (“In practice, however,
substantial transaction costs prevent international agreements from specifying every possible
future contingency . . . [and] it is often impossible to predict all potential future states of the world,
let alone to list them all in an agreement.”).
122. See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text (providing example).
123. See, e.g., The Department of Justice’s National Security Division Chief Addresses China’s
Campaign To Steal U.S. Intellectual Property, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 17, 2021), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/department-justice-s-national-security-division-chief-addresseschina-s-campaign-to [https://perma.cc/FT8J-ZFHN] (U.S. Department of Justice official
discussing the Chinese government’s “economic espionage” and theft of U.S companies’ IP
information). The United States could first try to prevent the initial grant and disclosure of a
patent that presents extreme national security concerns by issuing a “secrecy order.” Kate S.
Gaudry & James Golladay, What Happens When the Feds Decide an Invention Is ‘Secret?,’ NAT’L
DEF. (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2015/12/31/2016januarywhat-happens-when-the-feds-decide-an-invention-is-secret [https://perma.cc/5TV7-XSFX]. However,
secrecy orders are rarely issued—less than 1 percent of all applications in the U.S. are subjected
to a secrecy order. Id.
124. See, e.g., WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 4, at 22 (advocating the
treatment of space as a distinct territory for patents).
125. See Ram S. Jakhu, Bhupendra Jasani & Jonathan C. McDowell, Critical Issues Related
to Registration of Space Objects and Transparency of Space Activities, 143 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA
406, 407–08 (2018) (suggesting an alternative to the current Registration Convention would be to
assign jurisdiction based on place of incorporation).
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activities take place,126 not the nationality of an inventor.127 Applying
jurisdiction based on a company’s place of incorporation would
essentially create a nationality rule for patent jurisdiction in space.
Consequently, patents in space would be unnecessarily incongruous
with patent law on Earth.128 Instead, space should act as a distinct
territory with clear boundaries, much like the borders of countries.129
Regardless of if a company has launched a satellite,130 created an
extraterrestrial pharmaceutical factory,131 or brought tourists to the
moon,132 patent laws should apply based on where these activities
occur—the territory of space. Treating space as a distinct territory is a
straightforward application of the current patent law framework on
Earth.
The United States should collaborate with other countries to treat
space as a separate territory with distinct patent laws. This would allow
the United States to reduce ambiguities ex ante, thereby incentivizing
U.S. companies to obtain patents on innovative space technology.
III. ACHIEVING SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SPACE PATENT
REGIME
For an international space patent regime to be effective, its
backers must convince other countries to agree to follow the
regulations. This task is difficult for two primary reasons. First,
recognizing an international set of regulations for patents in space
would require states to give up some of their sovereignty.133

126. See Hammerle & Ro, supra note 93, at 251 (emphasizing that “[t]he core of the U.S.
Patent Act’s provisions on infringement has historically been explicitly territorial in its
jurisdictional scope of infringing subject matter”); see also Erstling, supra note 115, at 509
(underscoring the “strict territorial limitation of U.S. patent law”).
127. Foreign Applicants for U.S. Patents, BUS. PATS., http://www.the-business-of-patents.com
/foreign-applicants.html [https://perma.cc/662G-PBA7]. But see WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
supra note 4, at 21 (“[M]any national laws require that an inventor should first apply for patent
protection in the State of which the inventor is a resident or in the State in which the invention
was made.”).
128. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
129. See Eric Betz, The Kármán Line: Where Does Space Begin?, ASTRONOMY (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://astronomy.com/news/2021/03/the-krmn-line-where-does-space-begin [https://perma.cc/H4
NH-T46Y] (emphasizing that it is feasible to demarcate a boundary for where space begins).
130. See, e.g., supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
132. See Freeland, supra note 85, at 13 (describing the potential emergence of space tourism).
133. Kleiman, supra note 60, at 6. Depending on the enforcement mechanism chosen for the
regulations, states may also have to surrender sovereignty by recognizing a supranational body to
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Sovereignty stands for the broad principle that each state has the
independent authority to set legal rules within its territory,134 and is
traditionally considered one of the most fundamental principles in
international law.135 Accordingly, states are often reluctant to give up
sovereignty. Recognizing a supranational patent law regime for space
would require states to discontinue applying domestic patent law to
their “territories” through the Registration Convention, thereby
sacrificing sovereignty.136 Second, different states hold conflicting
views on patent protection.137 Although many industrialized nations
view strong patent protection as an essential component of the modern
economy, developing nations often prefer weaker protection to allow
for more widespread access to technology.138 These two problems will
complicate any effort to obtain global support for a space patent
regime.139
Previous works have failed to adequately justify how achieving
global support is feasible in an international space patent regime. Some
proposals have suggested that simply housing the international regime
in an already existing international organization could resolve this
issue.140 According to these proposals, because an esteemed
international organization has already obtained a level of international
legitimacy, states would choose to respect space patent laws out of

enforce the regulations. See Weisfeiler, supra note 19, at 8–9 (advocating for WIPO to enforce
patents in space).
134. See generally Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 1050 (2004) (discussing in detail the different interpretations of sovereignty in practice).
135. See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a PeopleCentered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (1993) (“Sovereignty is
the fundamental concept around which international law presently is organized.”); see also EMER
DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 290 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund,
Inc. 2008) (1797) (“Of all the rights that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most
precious.”); Kofi Darko Asante, Election Monitoring’s Impact on the Law: Can It Be Reconciled
with Sovereignty and Nonintervention?, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 235, 235 (1994) (stating that
sovereignty is the source “from which all specific political powers are derived” (quoting
Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990))).
136. See supra Part II.A.
137. Kleiman, supra note 60, at 6.
138. Bird & Jain, supra note 12.
139. See Kleiman, supra note 60, at 6 (admitting that garnering support for an international
regime would be a “politically difficult task”).
140. See Jimenez, supra note 93, at 468 (advocating to house the international regime in the
U.N.); Weisfeiler, supra note 19, at 9 (advocating to house the international regime in both the
U.N. and WIPO).
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deference to the organization.141 However, this represents a somewhat
superficial analysis of what is necessary to achieve international
recognition. Currently, there is not a standard international set of
patent laws for the territory of space.142 Therefore, any proposed
reforms would act as a new set of international standards and require
positive support from states, regardless of which organization
promulgated the standards.
This Part demonstrates how support for an international space
patent regime is attainable under a rational choice theory of
international law. Broadly, rational choice theory attempts to explain
state behavior by assuming that states have distinct interests and that
states will act rationally to maximize these interests.143 For patents in
space, there are many interests a state may attempt to balance.
Nevertheless, this Part will assume a state has two dominant interests:
the state’s general preference for patent protection and the state’s
involvement in the space industry.
Using these assumptions, it is helpful to visualize a graph that
organizes states based on their likelihood of support for an
international set of patent regulations in space. The graph measures
space ambitions on the horizontal axis and patent protection
preference on the vertical axis, with states sorted into quadrants based
on their interests. In the first quadrant are the states most interested in
an international space patent regime. This includes states, such as the
United States, that prefer patent protection and plan to participate
heavily in the space industry.144 In the second and third quadrants are
states that are somewhat ambivalent to participating in an international
space patent regime. This includes states that value patent protection
but currently have no aspirations to participate in the space industry
(quadrant II). Additionally, this includes states that are generally
against patent protection but likewise are not involved in the space
industry (quadrant III). Finally, the fourth quadrant contains the states
that are most opposed to a potential international space patent regime.
This consists of states that are generally against patent protection but
141. See Jimenez, supra note 93, at 465–66 (acknowledging that while it would be “very difficult”
to get countries to support an international framework, this could be overcome simply by
“designat[ing] the power to design space patent law to the most iconic entity in terms of
international neutrality: The United Nations”).
142. See supra Parts I–II.
143. See supra note 10 (providing explanation).
144. See infra fig.1. The specific states in Figure 1 were chosen to represent the diverse spread
of patent protection and space ambitions.
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plan to participate in the space industry. The graph below
approximates where real-world states would fall on these metrics.

Patent Protection

Singapore

II

Japan
European Union
China

Morocco

United States

I

Russia
Phillippines
Indonesia

III

Thailand

India

South Africa

IV

Venezuela

Space Ambitions

Figure 1: State Space Ambitions vs. State Patent Protection145
The following Sections will individually analyze each group of
similarly situated states. This first requires identifying the distinct
incentives and disincentives each group of states may face when
deciding whether to participate in an international patent regime for
space. Then, the Section will identify what factors, if any, may
ultimately motivate a state to support the regime.

145. Figure 1 was made by plotting a state’s current government space budget with the state’s
IP Index Score. See SpaceTech Government Activity 2021 / Q2 Landscape Overview, supra note
27 (analyzing space activity in various countries); see generally U.S. CHAMBER IP INDEX 2021,
supra note 16 (analyzing the strength of IP protection in various countries). Of course, there are
numerous other factors besides government spending that measure a state’s involvement in the
space industry. Additionally, a state’s current involvement in the space industry does not
necessarily indicate the state’s future ambitions to participate in the space industry. However, this
graph is not an exact formula and is only meant to present a rough approximation to help visualize
what a country’s interests might be.
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A. States in Favor of an International Space Patent Regime: Why the
United States Should Act First
The states most likely to support an international set of patent
regulations for space are states that prefer patent protection and plan
to participate heavily in the space industry. Notable examples include
the United States, European Union member states, Japan, China, and
Russia.146
Broadly, these states face a coordination problem often referred
to in international law as the “battle-of-the-sexes.”147 In this dilemma,
states first face a particular problem. Although the states all have
incentives to resolve the problem, the states may prefer different
solutions.148 Accordingly, states may struggle to reach a consensus on
the appropriate solution.149 After all, if a state’s own solution is not
chosen as the consensus, it will be at a disadvantage relative to the state
whose solution is chosen. Nevertheless, the negative impact of not
reaching a consensus at all is greater than the negative consequences
of not having a state’s own solution used.150 For this reason, establishing
a single set of regulations is in the best interest of each state.151
In the context of space, the aforementioned states all have an
interest in having a standard set of patent laws. An international space
patent regime would clarify jurisdictional rules and help eliminate the
flag of convenience problem, encouraging private space companies to
obtain patents.152 Although each state would prefer to have its own
domestic patent law used as the substantive guidelines for the
international regime, implementing a consensus solution produces a
net benefit over not reaching a solution at all. Thus, these states would
likely agree to an international set of patent laws once a focal point is
established.153
The United States should act first to create the focal point of an
international set of patent laws. One apparent disincentive for the
146. See supra fig.1.
147. Andrew T. Guzman, The Consent Problem in International Law 50 (Berkeley Program
in L. & Econ., Working Paper Series, 2011) [hereinafter Guzman, The Consent Problem].
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra Part II.
153. See Guzman, The Consent Problem, supra note 147 (“It is well established that creation
of a focal point is enough to solve the [battle-of-the-sexes] game.”). Here, “focal point” refers to
the initial set of laws used as the set of regulations for all states.
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United States to do so is that the private space industry, while growing,
still has high barriers to entry.154 Further, formalizing the focal point
into a multilateral agreement involves substantial transaction costs,
such as identifying the relevant states, understanding each state’s
preferences, and coordinating these preferences by negotiating over
the substance and form of the agreement.155 Consequently, the United
States would initially have to expend a large amount of effort to
establish a focal point for the regulations, even though patent
infringement in space is not currently prevalent.156 But even assuming
the rapid commercialization of space will not pose an immediate
problem for patentees,157 the United States still has incentives to take
the lead on setting the international space patent standards.
Specifically, acting first would allow the United States to have a greater
impact on what the substantive patent laws for space will be.
The benefit of acting first in battle-of-the-sexes games was
demonstrated by the United States’ proactive involvement in the
internet. In the early stages of the internet, there was no formalized
method for registering domain names for websites.158 Coordination was
necessary among states to ensure a standardized system where each
domain name would correspond to a distinct IP address.159 The United
States was the first country to create a focal point for this coordination,
by founding the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (“ICANN”) to manage internet domain names globally.160
As part of the founding, the United States stipulated that ICANN be

154. See Kleiman, supra note 60, at 5 (noting that the flag of convenience problem is not yet
prevalent because the private space industry is still growing).
155. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (“In order to
carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to
inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a
bargain . . . .”); Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 121, at 1846 (proposing that
international law operates in two stages, and “[i]n the first stage, states negotiate over the content
of the law and the level of commitment”).
156. Coase, supra note 155; Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 121.
157. See Kleiman, supra note 60, at 5.
158. Jon Bing, Building Cyberspace: A Brief History of Internet, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE:
INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS 8, 35 (Lee A. Bygrave & Jon Bing eds., 2009).
159. Lee A. Bygrave, Susan Schiavetta, Hilde Thunem, Annebeth B. Lange & Edward
Phillips, The Naming Game: Governance of the Domain Name System, in INTERNET
GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 158, at 147, 149–50.
160. Lee A. Bygrave & Terje Michaelsen, Governors of Internet, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE:
INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 158, at 92, 103.
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based in U.S. territory and thereby subject to U.S. law.161 Moreover,
the United States guided ICANN policy and retained oversight of
many substantive tasks ICANN performed.162 Ultimately, ICANN
received global recognition and standardized the domain name system
of the internet.163 Simply by being the first state to create a focal point
for coordination, the United States was able to exert significant
influence over the substantive laws of the internet.
Granted, it will be more difficult for the United States to exert
influence in the context of patents for space than with domain names
for the internet. During the creation of ICANN, there were no other
domain name systems.164 Other countries besides the United States
likely did not have robust solutions of their own to serve as a focal
point.165 This would decrease incentives for a country to oppose the
United States’ solution of ICANN.166 Conversely, other countries
already have their own domestic patent systems.167 Consequently, the
United States may receive greater resistance from countries because
each country would prefer its own domestic patent law serve as the
focal point.168 Still, there is currently no focal point for a standardized
patent system in space. Therefore, although it might be more difficult
for the United States to exert total control over the consensus solution,
acting first would nonetheless give the United States much greater
influence over the substantive patent laws for space.
Thus, while support for an international space patent regime is
probable among highly incentivized states, the United States would
benefit further by being the first state to create a focal point for
161. Emily M. Weitzenboeck, Hybrid Net: The Regulatory Framework of ICANN and the
DNS, 22 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 49, 53 (2014).
162. Id.; see also Bygrave et al., supra note 159, at 152 (describing initial domain name
management as a “collaborative project” between ICANN and the U.S. government).
163. See Lawrence B. Solum, Models of Internet Governance, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE:
INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 158, at 48, 60 (detailing the broad acceptance
of ICANN’s domain name system).
164. See Bygrave & Michaelsen, supra note 160, at 104 (acknowledging that before the
creation of ICANN, management of domain names was “ad hoc” and “relatively informal”).
165. See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text.
167. See Protecting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Overseas, supra note 17 (“Almost every
country has its own patent law . . . .”).
168. Moreover, the disparities between these countries’ patent laws are not always minor. See
supra note 112. For instance, Russia’s requirement of mandatory patent sublicensing differs
appreciably from U.S. patent law. Weisfeiler, supra note 19, at 5 n.45. As the magnitude of the
disparity grows, a country will be more likely to compete with the United States in establishing a
focal point.
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coordination. This would allow the United States to ensure that much
of U.S. patent law is incorporated into the substantive patent laws of
space.
B. States Currently Without Space Ambitions: Why Support of an
International Space Patent Regime Is Still Relevant
The states that may be indifferent to supporting an international
set of patent regulations for space are those that have no immediate
plans to participate in the space industry. This includes states with
varying levels of support for patent protection. Examples of states with
no involvement in the space industry who prefer patent protection
might include Morocco and Singapore.169 On the other hand, nonspacefaring states that are generally against patent protection could
include Venezuela and South Africa.170
As a practical matter, analyzing a state’s incentives for a standard
set of space patent rules is only necessary to the extent that the state is
actually able to violate the international regulations.171 For instance, if
a state were never involved in space in any way, then there would be
no opportunity for the state to violate patent laws for space.
Accordingly, the state’s preference for patent laws in space would be
of little importance because it would not be able to exploit the flag of
convenience loophole.172 However, as the space industry grows, states’
preferences and attitudes toward space may change.173 Thus, it is still
relevant to examine non-spacefaring states’ incentives, since these
states might engage in the space industry in the future.
Even without space ambitions, non-spacefaring states may have
some incentives to support an international space patent regime.
Specifically, innovations in space may nonetheless provide benefits to
countries on Earth.174 For instance, nearly all countries benefit from the
use of satellite technology, regardless of whether the country has

169. See supra fig.1.
170. See supra fig.1.
171. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 10, at 22 (“It is necessary to
determine if and when international law changes the behavior of states.” (emphasis added)).
172. See supra Part II.A.
173. See GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 10, at 27 (noting the
payoffs for states may change over time).
174. See generally WORLD ECON. F., SIX WAYS SPACE TECHNOLOGIES BENEFIT LIFE ON
EARTH (2020), https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GFC_Six_ways_space_technologies_202
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RB6-XHCU] (describing various benefits from space technology, such as
improved disaster response, communication technology, and environmental regulation).
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further space ambitions.175 Satellites can increase connectivity, improve
sustainability, and assist healthcare systems.176 Supporting an
international space patent regime may give non-spacefaring states a
greater say in how the substantive patent regulations impact these
resources.177
Still, non-spacefaring states have competing disincentives to
commit to an international set of regulations for patents in space. The
high transaction costs and effort necessary to create these regulations
may disincentivize states that prefer patent protection but are not
involved in the space industry.178 Because these states do not have any
current plans to participate in the space industry actively, they might
decide the transaction costs outweigh the benefits of providing input
for substantive patent law.179 Further, non-spacefaring states that are
generally against patent protection would be especially unlikely to
commit to a set of regulations that purports to strengthen patent
protection.
Non-spacefaring states in favor of patent protection will likely join
an international space patent regime if the space industry grows. As
noted previously, the high initial transaction costs of creating
regulations may disincentivize these states from helping create
international standards.180 However, there may be fewer transaction
costs in adopting the patent regulations after the standards have

175. See Keith Gottschalk, Here’s How Satellites Have Changed the Modern World, WORLD
ECON. F. (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/heres-how-satellites-havechanged-the-modern-world [https://perma.cc/VDS7-QUDV] (noting that even non-spacefaring
countries have benefited from satellite use and, in some cases, have paid spacefaring countries to
launch satellites for them).
176. Deanna Wetmore, How Satellite Technology Is Helping Developing Countries, BORGEN
PROJECT (Nov. 2, 2017), https://borgenproject.org/satellite-technology-is-helping-developing-cou
ntries [https://perma.cc/9NZU-UDWP].
177. See generally Martha Finnemore & Michelle Jurkovich, Getting a Seat at the Table: The
Origins of Universal Participation and Modern Multilateral Conferences, 20 GLOB. GOVERNANCE
361 (2014) (attributing broad participation in multilateral agreements to increased voting rights
and influence for smaller states).
178. See GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 10, at 121 (“Rationality
implies that states will seek to maximize the joint surplus of any agreement, taking into account
transaction costs.”). Admittedly, the transaction costs of joining the agreement would be lower
after negotiations have taken place. Thus, it is possible some states may strategically forgo
participating in negotiations and later join the agreement after transaction costs have decreased.
However, a state runs the risk of the final agreement being in tension with its domestic patent
laws. See supra note 112 (highlighting differences in domestic patent laws).
179. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 10, at 121.
180. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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already been created and negotiated.181 In addition to a reduction in
disincentives, these states would also experience an increase in
incentives to adhere to a set of patent regulations if they develop space
ambitions as the industry grows. Consequently, their incentives to
support an international set of regulations would be similar to the
incentives of current spacefaring states in favor of patent protection.182
Surprisingly, non-spacefaring states against patent protection may
still adhere to an international set of patent regulations for space, even
if the space industry grows. A state will comply with international law
if the incentives to comply outweigh the disincentives.183 If a state
against patent protection suddenly gained space ambitions, there may
be a disincentive to comply with an international set of patent laws for
space.184 Certainly, it is unlikely a state against patent protection would
have immediate incentives to affirmatively support a regime that
increases patent protection. However, a state may still have incentives
to comply with an agreement even if it does not explicitly endorse the
agreement.185 For instance, a state may gain reputational benefits, such
as the approval of the United States, by not violating the international
space patent standards.186 If these reputational benefits exceed the
economic benefits of limiting patent protection in space, a state will
choose to comply with the standards, regardless of whether there is an
explicit agreement. As emphasized before, even if a state does not
affirmatively support an international regime, mere compliance with
the regime’s standards could eliminate issues such as the flag of
convenience problem.187 Ultimately, this all depends on how much a
state can benefit by violating patent protections in space. If a state can
obtain a comparatively large benefit from violating patent protections,

181. See supra note 178.
182. See supra Part III.A.
183. See Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 121, at 1853 (“A country’s
decision to follow international law reflects a judgment that the costs of a violation outweigh the
benefits.”).
184. See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text (noting that the ultimate standards may
conflict with a state’s domestic patent laws and preferences).
185. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 10, at 133 (emphasizing that
even without legal obligations, “forces of reputation, retaliation, and reciprocity give states an
incentive to comply”).
186. See id. at 73 (pointing out that honoring commitments is one way a state can gain
reputational benefits).
187. See supra Part II.A.
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then it will likely affirmatively oppose an international regime for
space.188
C. States Opposed to an International Space Patent Regime: How the
United States Can Still Achieve Support
The states most likely to oppose an international set of patent
regulations for space are those that generally oppose patent protection
and have current plans to participate in the space industry. Notable
examples include India and Indonesia.189 For these states, the potential
benefit of violating patent protections in space outweighs any
incentives to abide by a set of regulations.190 Consequently, the United
States would have to create additional incentives to elicit compliance
and support for an international space patent regime from these states.
The United States could utilize both substantive and formal
concessions to create these additional incentives while still ensuring a
strong international space patent framework.191
One strategy the United States could pursue is to broaden the
scope of the negotiations and make substantive concessions unrelated
to patent laws in space.192 This technique was used previously in the
context of intellectual property rights during the negotiation of the
TRIPS Agreement.193 TRIPS is the most comprehensive multilateral
agreement on intellectual property to date194 and required signatories
to establish a minimum standard of intellectual property protection.195
During negotiations, developed states remained steadfast in requiring
robust intellectual property protections.196 Accordingly, there was very
little room for bargaining over the substantive intellectual property
rights provisions of the agreement.197 To overcome this, developed
countries widened the scope of negotiations and made concessions on
188. See infra Part III.C.
189. See supra fig.1.
190. See supra notes 168–173 and accompanying text.
191. This Section assumes that the United States would attempt to avoid making substantive
concessions related to patent law. See, e.g., supra note 112. However, as noted before, at least
some substantive concessions related to patent law might be necessary even among incentivized
states. See supra notes 147–153 and accompanying text.
192. See GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 10, at 165 (noting that
broadening the scope of a negotiation can help garner support for an agreement).
193. Id. at 167.
194. Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 31.
195. Id.
196. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 10, at 166.
197. Id.
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market access, agricultural subsidies, and protection from unilateral
sanctions by the United States.198 These concessions increased
developing countries’ incentives to support the TRIPS Agreement.
Similarly, the United States could attempt to make concessions
unrelated to patent laws in space to obtain support for an international
space patent regime. This would ensure that the United States would
not have to lower substantive patent protections in space for U.S.
patentees.
Additionally, the United States could attempt to change the form
of the agreement itself. The form includes the parts of the agreement
that determine the degree to which a state pledges to be bound by an
obligation.199 As with substantive provisions, states weigh the costs
imposed by formal provisions of an agreement when deciding whether
to join.200 Moreover, if a particular form requires a lower level of
commitment, joining the agreement imposes fewer costs on a state.201
Decreasing the costs to join the agreement means more states are likely
to join.202 Because global support is necessary for an international space
patent regime to be effective,203 it might be beneficial for the United
States to accept a less binding agreement to increase overall support
for the agreement.
Transition periods are a specific formal design element the United
States could use to lower the level of commitment. By providing a state
with additional time before the substantive provisions of an agreement
begin to bind it, transition periods allow a state to avoid the immediate
costs of compliance.204 For instance, the agreement for patents in space
could be structured to give developing countries more time to adopt
the standard substantive patent laws. This would address economic and
administrative constraints that many developing countries currently

198. Id. at 166–67.
199. Id. at 131.
200. See id. at 134, 137 (noting that “formal design elements can affect the seriousness of
commitment” and that states will change these elements to “maximize the value of the
agreement”).
201. Id. at 136.
202. See id. at 173 (emphasizing that membership can be increased by weakening the
commitments required to join an agreement).
203. See supra Part II.
204. See Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS, supra note 34 (explaining that transition
periods allow countries to delay applying provisions of an agreement); see also GUZMAN, HOW
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 10, at 156 (arguing that the form of an agreement
affects future behavior and impacts the cost of joining an agreement).
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face in implementing patent protection205 and thereby lessen the
disincentives a state may have to support an international space patent
regime. A similar strategy was used to elicit support for the TRIPS
Agreement, where developing countries were given a transition period
of four years.206 A transition period would likely be even more effective
in the context of patent protection in space. Because patent
infringement in space is currently less common than infringement on
Earth,207 a longer transition period could be granted until the private
space industry has fully developed.208 The longer transition period
would provide even greater incentives for states to support patent
regulations in space than with the TRIPS Agreement.
However, the United States must be cautious not to allow formal
concessions that render the substantive portions of the agreement
ineffective. The ability of formal concessions to diminish an
agreement’s effectiveness is demonstrated by the failure of the Kyoto
Protocol on climate change.209 Climate change represented a similar
collective action problem to patents in space and required global
support.210 To achieve widespread support, developing nations were
initially subjected to less rigid emissions requirements than developed
nations.211 Yet, developing nations represented some of the largest
polluters.212 Consequently, the weaker obligations allowed developing
nations to continue to pollute at high levels, reducing the effectiveness
of restrictions developed countries faced.213 For patents in space, it is
205. Bird & Jain, supra note 12.
206. See Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS, supra note 34 (listing countries that were
granted a transition period for TRIPS). Note that many of the countries that would be most
opposed to an international space patent regime, such as India and Indonesia, were also
developing countries given transition periods under the TRIPS Agreement.
207. See Ro et al., supra note 26, at 205–06 (noting that as commercial space industries grow,
patent litigation in space will become more prevalent).
208. This transition period could work on a country-specific basis, giving countries with
smaller space activities more time to accept the agreement.
209. See Mary J. Bortscheller, Equitable but Ineffective: How the Principle of Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities Hobbles the Global Fight Against Climate Change, 2 CLIMATE L.
REP. 49, 51 (2010) (claiming exceptions in the Kyoto Protocol rendered the agreement
ineffective).
210. See id. at 49 (emphasizing that climate change requires an international response).
211. Kayla Clark, The Paris Agreement: Its Role in International Law and American
Jurisprudence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107, 110 (2018) (noting that developing
nations were considered less capable of immediately implementing emissions standards because
of economic factors, similar to arguments made in the intellectual property context).
212. Id. at 110–11.
213. See id. at 111 (arguing that ineffective use of transition periods rendered the Kyoto
Protocol “unambitious in both spirit and execution”).
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imperative the United States avoid formal concessions that would
render an international agreement ineffective. If patent protections in
space are too weak,214 then the agreement will be ineffective in
incentivizing patentees, regardless of how many states support the
agreement. In this way, the potential effectiveness of the agreement
serves as a limiting factor on the formal concessions the United States
should make.
Overall, support for an international space patent regime is readily
achievable even from spacefaring states that generally oppose patent
protection. Although gaining their support would require additional
incentives, other examples in international law demonstrate
concessions are effective so long as they do not undermine the
substantive thrust of an agreement.
CONCLUSION
The current framework for patents in outer space unduly
disincentivizes U.S. patentees from obtaining patents. The United
States should realign the current system of carrots and sticks in order
to increase global innovation and technical knowledge. Specifically, the
United States should collaborate with other countries to create a single
set of substantive and procedural patent laws to govern the distinct
territory of space. Although countries may have varying interests, the
United States can achieve support for this regime using insights from
the intersection of rational choice theory and international law.

214. See supra Part II.

